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This study assesses the risk-related reporting practices of 190 Portuguese 
credit institutions based on a content analysis of their individual annual 
reports for 2006. Risk-related disclosures are found to be deficient in 
terms of comparability because they use different maturity time bands to 
report exposures to credit, market and liquidity risks; different VaR and 
sensitivity analysis assumptions; and different practices for reporting 
capital structure and adequacy. Relevance, reliability and 
understandability problems arose too from the mis-alignment of 
quantitatively-based disclosures and related narratives.  
 
We assess the extent to which reforms of risk-related reporting practices in 
2007 in International Financial Reporting Standards and the BASEL II 
Accord address each of the deficiencies identified. We highlight areas in 
need of further reform and recommend that Portuguese supervisory 
authorities adopt more effective enforcement mechanisms to broker 
compliance with minimum mandatory risk disclosure requirements. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Since the global financial crisis [GFC] of 2008, the quality of risk-related disclosures in 
the banking sector has become a matter of close scrutiny, especially by investors and 
regulators. Even before the GFC, the inadequacies of risk-related disclosures in annual 
reports had been a matter of public debate. Woods,1 for example, drew attention to 
variations in the level and usefulness of risk-related information disclosed by companies 
and the difficulties involved in capturing risk exposures of companies. In 2008, the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) emphasised that the banking sector often failed to 
disclose the magnitude of risk associated with their products clearly in an easily 
accessible way.2 According to Heap,3 this “led to […] a failure in confidence” in the 
financial system.  
Although new breadth has been brought to risk reporting practices by 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures), a lack of transparency in the risk reporting disclosures of banks has been 
found in periods prior to the adoption of IFRS 7,4-16 and in studies after the adoption of 
IFRS 7.17-21  
However, the representativeness of the results of these studies can be questioned 
on three major grounds. First, the small size of the samples used. Second, because banks 
are only a small part of the banking sector. We address this by analysing 190 credit 
institutions [PCIs], including banks. And third, because the use of market-based 
measures (such as market capitalization) are an inappropriate mean of ranking banks by 
size — they incorporate “investors’ viewpoints on company performance, thus ignoring 
other stakeholder groups”.22  
Stakeholder power can be proxied by the public visibility of an entity. Greater 
public visibility implies a greater need to heed stakeholders’ expectations.22 In Portugal, 
 3
banks have a high degree of public visibility. Since 2006, the number of branches of 
credit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants has been almost three times greater than in 
European Common Law countries (UK, Ireland and Netherlands). Among the European 
Latin countries Portugal has registered the highest growth rate in the number of 
branches of banks.23  
The present study focuses on the usefulness of disclosures about mandatory and 
voluntary risk-related information in the individual annual reports for 2006 of 190 
finance companies (not only banks) registered by the Portuguese Central Bank. The four 
qualitative characteristics of financial statements, enunciated in the International 
Accounting Standards Board’s conceptual framework for accounting, are used to assess 
usefulness: relevance, reliability, understandability and comparability.24  
Despite focusing on risk-related disclosures before the adoption of IFRS 7, the 
present study also analyses operational risk-related disclosures and capital structure and 
adequacy disclosures, and levels of adherence to Basel II (Pillar III) requirements. Thus, 
the present study yields an exhaustive view of risk-related reporting disclosures 
practices in Portugal.  
Results reveal that the adoption of IFRS led to greater amounts of risk-related 
information being disclosed compared to that required by the Portuguese Accounting 
Plan for the Banking Sector [PAPBS]. Transparency across companies was impaired by 
comparability difficulties, by inability to understand narratives, and by the failure of 
narratives to explain numerical disclosures. The resulting imprecision, vagueness and 
misleading statements rendered readers susceptible to multiple interpretations. 
Additionally, the results also reveal sub-optimal levels of mandatory risk-related 
disclosure in annual reports. The pre-GFC period transparency problems in Portuguese 
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financial institutions were essentially the same as those detected in Anglo-Saxon 
studies.4,6,8-11,16 
The sub-optimal levels of mandatory risk-related information found in this 
study, and in studies before and after the adoption of IFRS 7, suggest that the recent 
Basel II Accord reforms, FSF recommendations, and IFRS 7 amendments would only 
lead to “socially desirable” flow of information if an appropriate enforcement 
mechanism assured compliance with minimum disclosure requirements.  
In Section 2 we develop an analytical framework and briefly contextualise the 
regulatory setting in Portugal. Section 3 explains our research method and describes the 
sample. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Regulatory background 
PCIs are supervised by accounting rules and reporting requirements issued by the 
Portuguese Central Bank. For listed companies, some risk-related corporate governance 
practice disclosures are required by the recommendations of the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange Committee (Comissão do Mercado dos Valores Mobiliários). (For example, 
Recommendation 3/2005 requires description of the existing internal control system). 
Additionally, Article 66 of the Portuguese Companies’ Code (Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais) requires companies to disclose their main risks and uncertainties in the 
management report. Although Article 66 focuses on financial risks, it also requires (at 
least implicitly) disclosure of information about environmental risks, operational risks 
and risk management activities related to financial risks. 
For financial years starting on January 1, 2005, Regulation 1606/2002 of the 
European Commission requires companies whose securities are traded on a regulated 
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market to prepare consolidated accounts in accord with IAS. From 2005, the Portuguese 
Central Bank supervised the application of that Regulation 1606/2002 in the banking 
sector. The accounting frame of reference from 2005 onwards was as follows: 
a) In 2005, listed and non-listed companies (with an exception for Mutual 
Agricultural Credit banks [MACBs]) in a regulated market were required to adopt 
adjusted IAS/IFRS or Instruction 4/96 (PAPBS) in their individual accounts. After 
January, 2006, they were required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual 
accounts; 
b) In 2005, MACBs were required to adopt Instruction 4/96 (PAPBS) in their 
individual accounts. In 2006, they were required to adopt Instruction 4/96 
(PAPBS) or adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual accounts. After January, 2007 
they were required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual accounts. 
Therefore, in reporting risk-related information in 2006, PCIs would have adopted 
adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual accounts (with the exception of MACBs) and 
would have complied with the following standards:  
• IAS 1 (Presentation of Financial Statements);25  
• IAS 30 (Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions);  
• IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation);26  
• IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement);27 and,  
• IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets). 
IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) was only obligatory after January, 
2007, although its adoption before 2007 was recommended.  
 6
Minimum disclosure requirements 
Under the PAPBS there are very few disclosure requirements for risk matters. Those 
that exist relate to accounting policies (basically about impaired assets and provisions), 
credit risk (aging of assets according to maturity dates, details of impaired loans and 
advances), and liquidity risk (maturity analysis of current assets and liabilities). There is 
no requirement to disclose risk management information objectives, policies and control 
structure. 
 Under IAS/IFRS the risk-related disclosure requirements, described in Table 1, 
are more extensive and demanding.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Although disclosures should be provided in the notes, it is also possible to find 
cross references in the management report, in accord with § B6 (IFRS 7). Narrative 
information about financial risk management objectives and policies should be 
presented in the notes in self-contained risk management sections (IAS 1.104-5). PCIs 
adopting either PASBS or IAS/IFRS have to disclose this kind of information in self-
contained section of the management report, also as demanded by Article 66 of the 
Portuguese Companies’ Code. 
Literature review 
Although the banking sector is under-researched in terms of risk disclosures in 
corporate annual reports,14 studies have examined the importance of risk disclosure on 
the market discipline of risk taking in the banking industry. Findings of such studies 
confirm that greater disclosure enhances market discipline and that better risk 
management systems attract investors.28-30 Market discipline is defined as the “actions 
of shareholders, creditors and counterparties of banking companies [stakeholders] that 
can influence the investment, operational and risk-taking decisions of bank managers”.8  
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Due to the increasing complexity of financial activities pursued by banks, and 
consequently the inability to properly monitor and control financial companies, 
supervisory entities have relied on market discipline to assist in their oversight 
responsibility. “Market monitoring”31 as a market discipline to limit banks’ systemic 
risk is performed by unprotected creditors not covered by financial safety provisions.32 
The greater the level and quality of disclosure, the greater the ability of stakeholders to 
monitor and assess changes in bank condition and to incorporate those assessments 
promptly into a firm’s security price if negative changes occur. This monitoring 
mechanism generates market signals that convey useful information to supervisors in 
acting to reduce a bank’s risk exposure.31 The economic rationale is that in a 
substantially more complex environment, information disclosure is socially desirable.33  
The literature on risk-related disclosures by banks has shown that market 
discipline or the appropriate levels of supervisory oversight have been ineffective. To 
overcome this, standard setters have developed high quality standards to improve prior 
opaque disclosures, remedy their deficiencies, and enforce supervisory mechanisms (see 
Basel II, second Pillar). 
Studies before and after the adoption of high quality standards have reported 
conflicting results regarding the effectiveness of those standards on risk management 
disclosures. PriceWaterhouseCoopers12,21 found that the adoption of IAS/IFRS and 
IFRS 7 did not significantly affect the disclosure of risk management activities. 
However, Bischof17 and Woods et al.14 found the contrary. Some studies have also 
documented conflicting results in operational risk, and in market risk disclosures. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, from the Bank of International Settlements34-
36 and Helbok and Wagner37 found increases in both extent and the depth of voluntary 
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operational risk disclosure. Avram and Skully4 found increases in disclosure quality, but 
a stable level of disclosure quantity.   
KPMG,19,20 and PriceWaterhouseCoopers21reported that all surveyed banks 
disclosed information about VaR results. However, broader studies such as by Yong et 
al.13 (146 Asian Pacific banks surveyed) and Bischof17 (153 European banks surveyed) 
reveal different results: only a small number of banks disclosed VaR results before and 
after the adoption of IFRS 7.  
Persistent risk-related disclosure deficiencies 
The disclosure deficiencies reported before the adoption of IAS/IFRS and IFRS 7 
persisted after the adoption of those standards. Woods and Marginson16 and Woods et 
al.14,15 found that disclosures lacked transparency, were insufficient from a user’s 
perspective, and were not comparable. In terms of the diversity of parameters and 
assumptions used when related to VaR disclosures, Hirtle8 found the same deficiencies 
among US bank holding companies: only a few disclosed information for VaR by risk 
type, backtesting, and stress testing. However, market risk disclosures increased over 
the period 1994-2004. Yong et al.13 found that a third of the risk disclosures by Asia 
Pacific banks followed Basel recommendations. Despite almost all banks disclosing 
information about how they measure, manage and assess performance in managing 
market risks, only about one third of them reported quantitative information on market 
risk exposure and performance. Value-at-Risk disclosures were not comparable. A low 
level of disclosure of other kinds of risks (credit, liquidity, operational) was found too – 
such as disclosure of detailed policies to mitigate credit and liquidity risk 
concentrations. Pérignon et al.10 and Pérignon and Smith11 found a pervasive and 
persistent overstatement of the VaR results, and over use of historical simulation, 
leading to a lack of quality information, because of the flaws of this method.38  
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Boussanni et al.5 documented a wide disparity in the level and extent of liquidity 
risk financial disclosures between European banks. They found that disclosures about 
contingency planning and internal controls were the least substantive and complete. 
Further, risk disclosures were basically qualitative.9 These results were confirmed in 
studies by Ernst and Young,18 KPMG,19,20 and PriceWaterhouseCoopers.21 But other 
deficiencies were detected in:  
• credit risk disclosures (different time bands used in aging analysis of past due 
assets; lack of detailed description of the associated collateral); and  
• liquidity risk disclosures (generic liquidity risk management statements; 
misalignment between liquidity risk exposure and qualitative disclosures about 
management strategies to deal with those exposures; and the absence of 
sensitivity analysis of the liquidity risk exposure). 
The conclusions of these studies all emphasise the poor transparency features 
found, including unclear communication of the risks being managed,16 misalignments 
between key risk topics, imbalances of qualitative and quantitative data, undue reliance 
on statistical estimates to create a false sense of quantitative precision,39 and non-
compliance with minimum mandatory requirements.17  
Finance sector preparedness for risk disclosure 
Research from throughout the world reveals that managers and banks are ill-prepared to 
deal appropriately with risk exposures. In the USA a minority of banks used, or planned 
to use, in-house models of credit risk management.40 Most senior managers of Nigerian 
banks were not fully prepared to manage liquidity risk exposure and were not 
conversant with known methods of measuring and managing a bank’s liquidity 
exposure.41 Spanish saving banks did not have good knowledge of the operational risk 
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requirements of the Basel II Accord, they did not have an efficient organisational 
structure through which to implement an advanced operational risk information system, 
and their information systems were incapable of responding to Basel II requirements.42 
Despite a good understanding of risk and risk management, staff of banks in the United 
Arab Emirates still needed to know how to prioritize their main risk efficiently.43 
Generally, Islamic banks are moderately efficient in risk assessment and analysis, risk 
monitoring and identification.44 The risk measurement techniques they use 
predominantly involve maturity matching, gap analysis and credit ratings.45 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample 
From a population of 298 companies with individual annual reports published in the 
Portuguese Central bank database as at December 31, 2007 we have drawn a sample of 
190 PCIs (Table 2). We excluded all Portuguese financial institutions (99 companies) 
and nine credit institutions (two financial holding companies with incomplete annual 
accounts for 2006; four MACBs that adopted IAS/IFRS in 2006; and one investment 
bank and two financial holdings that adopted PAPBS in 2006).  
 (Insert Table 2 about here) 
Method 
We used content analysis to quantify the risk-related quantitative information and 
narrative information disclosed in the annual reports. All the items identified as risk 
disclosures required by IAS 1, IAS 30, IAS 32, IFRS 7 and the third Pillar of the Basel 
II Accord were included.46 There were six risk disclosure categories (defined in 
Appendix A):  
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• risk management objectives and policies: risk identification and definitions, risk 
management policies, and whether there was a comprehensive risk report; 
• credit risk: the size of credit risk exposure, size of past due and impaired assets, 
size of collateral (or other enhancements) held, and credit risk quality. 
• market risk: market risk exposure, and internal/external risk measurement 
models. 
• liquidity risk: liquidity risk exposure, and discussion of funding policies. 
• operational risk: operational risk exposure and adaptation of information 
systems to Basel II requirements 
• capital structure and adequacy: capital structure and amounts of Tier 1, 2 and 3; 
capital adequacy for the different types of risk exposure and capital ratios; and 
capital adequacy approaches adopted under Basel II. 
Content analysis was conducted in six stages, using a binary coding system. A 
credit institution was given a score of 1 if the item was reported, and 0 otherwise. Such 
disclosure scoring is useful in measuring the extent of, and variations in, the reporting 
practices of companies.14 We coded information about the location of disclosures in the 
annual report, narratives, and the information included in graphs and tables. Content 
analysis of the entire sample was performed by the first author, informed by his prior 
coding of an initial sample of four annual reports with another (independently 
operating) coder. An inter-coder reliability test was undertaken47 to measure the scale of 
coding errors (Scott’s pi = 86%). Such a level has been considered “an acceptable level 
of inter-coder reliability” in analysis of corporate report disclosures.48 
RESULTS  
Accounting and risk management objectives and policies 
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Table 3 shows that PCIs with the lowest frequencies of narrative disclosures about risk-
related information are those in which Portuguese accounting rules were adopted (that 
is, the MACBs). These results corroborate the view that the adoption of IAS/IFRS has 
brought a greater amount of risk-related disclosure.14,17 However, the location of these 
disclosures is not uniform. Other commercial and investment banks and CFIs usually 
discuss risk in specific sections of the annual report. But, financial holding companies 
and other entities have shown lower levels. The information is dispersed throughout the 
annual report, impairing understandability. Similar results were found in prior 
research14,16 for the periods before and after the adoption of IFRS 7.19,21 
 (Insert Table 3 about here) 
Another surprising result is the low frequency of disclosure of risk management 
policies and control structure in financial holding companies. However, extended 
disclosures were made at a consolidated level. 
Of the PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS in their individual annual reports, the highest 
level of disclosure was by the other commercial and investment banks, and CFIs. But, 
the quality of risk reporting practices varied widely. At one extreme, two commercial 
banks provided comprehensive risk reports. These contained key risks and their 
definition, the description of the overall control structure by each risk factor, the risk 
management policies followed, the risk measurement models used to assess each risk 
factor, and a discussion of some strategic objectives. At the other extreme, several 
entities expressed their risk exposures without further explanation — they only provided 
risk definitions, or only detailed the overall control structure. Moreover, there was a 
lack of clarity in risk management statements, consistent with the findings of KPMG19, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers21, and Woods and Marginson.16 This made it difficult to 
assess companies’ risk appetite appropriately. There was no clear identification of key 
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risks. Some companies used financial jargon without defining what was meant by terms 
such as Value-at-Risk, stress test, back test, and sensitivity analysis. Provision of such 
definitions would have helped readers to understand the risk information disclosed.  
Credit risk 
Table 4 (Panel A) shows that, except for financial holding companies, mandatory 
information required by IAS 30 and IAS 32 was followed by all PCIs. They disclosed 
information about the size of credit risk exposure, and past due and impaired financial 
assets, thereby helping to assure comparability and confirming research by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.21 However, understandability is undermined because 
narrative explanations of numerical information were lower than expected. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Despite assurance of comparability on these two aspects, there are differences in 
the details itemised for credit risk exposure and past due impaired financial assets. 
Disclosure of risk concentrations (by industry sector) had lower levels of disclosure. 
The information most disclosed was aggregated information. Such information is less 
costly to produce than non-aggregated information and the proprietary costs are lower. 
Because of their inherent proprietary nature, and the pre-GFC period of analysis, the 
size of collateral and the discussion of credit risk exposure show lower and different 
levels of disclosure. There were no disclosures for renegotiated assets. On the other 
hand, since this was voluntary information demanded by IFRS 7 only, another possible 
explanation for the lower levels of disclosure is the economic rationale that banks are 
“typically cautious to go beyond minimal disclosure requirements”.32 The disclosure 
level by companies adopting Portuguese accounting rules (the MACBs) are lower 
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compared to those adopting IAS/IFRS. Despite this difference, the disclosures are 
consistent and, therefore comparable. 
Among adopters of IAS/IFRS, there were higher levels of disclosure in other 
commercial and investment banks and CFIs, than in other entities. For commercial 
banks and CFIs, we also found higher levels of explanation of risk exposure in 
narratives, past due/impaired assets, and credit risk quality49 — indeed, higher than 
those found by Bischof17 in European commercial banks after the adoption of IFRS 7. 
Moreover, the disclosures were close to IFRS 7 requirements, except for the size of 
collateral held and renegotiated assets. They also seemed to be preparing their credit 
risk information under Basel II rules, since credit risk information by type of credit 
exposure, geographic distribution, industry type, and residual contractual maturity, was 
at high levels. 
Transparency flaws in credit risk disclosures are shown in Table 4 (Panel B). 
PCIs that followed IAS/IFRS were not consistent in the amounts of credit risk exposure 
disclosed by industry sector and by maturing assets. Some PCIs indicated explicitly that 
the amounts disclosed included maturing and past due assets, whereas others indicated 
explicitly that the amounts disclosed only included maturing assets. In the worst case, 
no explicit information was provided, making it difficult for a reader to understand what 
amount was disclosed. 
Table 4 (Panel B) also shows differences in the maturity/aged time bands used to 
disclose the amounts of credit risk exposure by maturing assets, and past due assets, 
respectively. The differences are in the maximum range in the qualitative groups, and 
different time bands for the prior/no prior year figures. The same problems were 
detected in studies after the adoption of IFRS 7.19-21 
Market risk 
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Table 5 (Panel A) shows a much lower level of market risk disclosure by companies 
that adopted the Portuguese accounting rules (the MACBs) than those that had adopted 
IAS/IFRS.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Among those companies that adopted IAS/IFRS, banks show the highest levels 
of disclosure compared to CFIs, financial holding companies and other entities. Not all 
of them disclosed information about market risk exposures for foreign exchange and 
interest rate risk. The results diverge between frequencies on the repricing gap 
presentation and the use of maturity dates/repricing gap to measure interest rate risk 
exposure. Thus, some PCIs do not disclose the amount of their exposure. Moreover, 
Table 5 (Panel A, and B) shows lower frequencies on monetary results for VaR and 
sensitivity analysis compared to the use of these two techniques. This is consistent with 
Bischof17 and Yong et al.13, but only for other commercial and investment banks. 
Although our results are a little higher than those found in their studies, they do not 
confirm findings of KPMG19,20 or PriceWaterhouseCoopers21(where all banks had 
disclosed VaR results). A plausible explanation is that the VaR disclosures are costly to 
prepare, complex to interpret, and inherently unreliable, resulting in non-disclosure 
policies.6  
On the other hand, VaR information is proprietary by nature. This prompts its 
withdrawal from annual reports to avoid gambling with a bank’s reputation.10,32 
Inconsistencies were detected for commercial and investment banks: these were related 
to VaR, stress tests, back tests, and sensitivity analysis, consistent with Bischof17, Ernst 
and Young18, KPMG19,20, PriceWaterhouseCoopers21, Yong et al.13, Woods and 
Marginson16, and Woods et al.14,15. Stress tests and backtests are essential to assess the 
reliability of VaR monetary values, and to help define risk profile more precisely.50 
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Only two commercial banks with comprehensive risk reports disclosed results of stress 
tests and backtests.  
Another interesting result is the prevalence of historical simulation to measure 
VaR, which as Pritsker38 notes “respond sluggishly to changes in conditional volatility, 
and respond to large price movements asymmetrically (…). Because of these 
deficiencies, errors in risk estimates accumulate through time and sometimes become 
very large (…) [such that] traditional backtests have little power to detect them.” VaR 
and sensitivity results are also not comparable. Panel B of Table 5 shows differences in 
assumptions and parameters used (relating to methods, confidence level, holding 
periods, period of analysis, basis point value, and period of impact). In some cases no 
information is provided.  
Of the other commercial and investment banks that presented a repricing gap 
table, we detected different maturity/repricing time bands (Table 5, Panel B). This 
impairs comparability across companies. The use of a repricing gap table is a naïve way 
of presenting interest rate risk exposure, unless accompanied by sensitivity results 
showing how a positive or negative parallel shift in the interest rate curve would affect 
the gap. Only one commercial bank with a comprehensive risk report disclosed this kind 
of information. The lack of objectivity diminished the understandability of risk 
information. 
Liquidity risk 
Table 6 (Panel A) shows that liquidity risk disclosures by companies adopting 
Portuguese accounting rules (MACBs) are lower (in level and quality) than for those 
adopting IAS/IFRS. Those companies did not disclose a liquidity gap analysis table. 
Instead, they presented a maturity analysis for current assets and liabilities, but 
separately.  
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
In respect of the PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS, Table 6 (Panel A) demonstrates 
non-compliance with minimum mandatory requirements established by IAS 30 and IAS 
32. A sub-optimal level of liquidity risk disclosure was found also by Yong et al.13, and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.21 This was characterised by low levels of discussion about 
detailed policies for mitigating liquidity risk or specific narratives on how liquidity risk 
is managed. Only half of the commercial and investment banks and CFIs disclosed their 
liquidity risk exposure using a maturity analysis table. Further, not all of them clearly 
stated the maturity concept used to build the gap analysis (Table 6, Panel B). There is 
poor alignment between numerical and narrative disclosures, consistent with the 
findings of Boussanni et al.5 (2008), Yong et al.,13 KPMG,19,20 and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.21 Few companies clearly discussed their funding policies and 
any alignment with their liquidity risk exposure. Users would be forced into 
considerable effort to link exposures to funding policies and to determine the possible 
reasons behind the adoption of those policies.  
The other PCIs either do not disclose any information, or disclose their maturity 
analysis separately (for specific items such as loans and advances, resources, 
derivatives, subordinated loans, investments held to maturity). Among the PCIs that 
have disclosed a liquidity gap analysis, the information disclosed is inconsistent, 
because maturity time bands differ (Table 6, Panel B), consistent with KPMG.19,20 
These practices make it difficult for users to assess banks’ liquidity risk exposure 
appropriately, or build a liquidity gap table. Consequently, comparability across 
companies is rendered difficult.  
Operational risk 
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Table 7 shows that only one commercial bank disclosed an amount for operational risk 
exposure. Only one commercial bank completed the Basel II adaptation process. Very 
low frequencies of operational risk management disclosures and risk exposures were 
disclosed by MACBs compared to the rest of the PCIs surveyed. Other commercial and 
investment banks, and CFIs made more disclosures of risk management policies and 
operational control structures, and operational risk exposures. It seems that these PCIs 
are still adapting to Basel II requirements. Therefore, they are more prone to address 
disclosure requirements regarding definitions and risk management policies in a self-
contained section of the management report and notes. Moreover, we found disclosures 
scattered throughout the management reports about the priorities of institutions in 
implementing new information systems, in training workers, and in restructuring 
organizations. Because 2006 was a complex period of adaptation, and because this is 
voluntary information, it is justifiable that, for reasons of caution and reputation 
damage, those disclosures are merely narrative, generic and imprecise.  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Capital structure and adequacy 
Table 8 (Panel A) shows the highest level of disclosure for capital structure and 
adequacy was by banks (MACBs, other commercial and investment banks). One 
plausible reason for this might be the assumption that higher levels of public visibility 
will increase banks’ needs to legitimise themselves to their customers, to inform them 
of their ability to avoid a banking crisis, and to protect depositors. These reasons have 
been used to explain the objectives of capital adequacy requirements.51 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
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However, few of these PCIs have included narrative disclosures to critically 
discuss the amounts calculated for total eligible capital value. As a consequence, 
understandability is impaired. 
Six banks (other commercial/investment banks) disclosed the approaches they 
followed to assess capital adequacy, capital requirements for credit, market and 
operational risk, and total capital ratio according to Basel II (Table 8, Panel A). Some 
signalled the adoption of the most advanced approaches in the near future – IRB for 
credit risk, internal models for market risk, and AMA for operational risk52 (Table 8, 
Panel B) but, using different disclosure patterns. Again, this is justifiable for reasons of 
caution and reputation damage, because PCIs were in a period of adaptation to a new 
frame of reference that was not yet mandatory (Pillar III of Basel II, IFRS 7 and IAS 1 
amendments).   
CONCLUSIONS 
When compared to Portuguese accounting rules, the adoption of IAS/IFRS has brought 
a greater flow of risk-related information. This was despite the risk information 
disclosed using Portuguese accounting standards being more comparable. Consistent 
with previous studies,21 the greater flow of risk-related information did not assure 
transparency across the Portuguese banking sector. 
Portugal is classified as a “Latin country”, and the Portuguese banking system 
has several characteristic features (such as its prominent visibility as a consequence of 
the greater number of branches). We found that the two commercial banks with better 
risk reporting performance had the highest number of branches, and are listed in a 
regulated market (Euronext Lisbon), and in a foreign stock exchange market. However, 
among the PCIs with a lower number of branches (CFIs and other entities) we found 
that the transparency flaws were more intense compared to commercial banks and 
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previous literature. Among financial holding companies there were low levels of 
disclosure because they opted to make extended disclosures at a consolidated level. Risk 
reporting practices among investment banks are similar to those of commercial banks. 
But, this is not explained by public visibility. Their number of branches is much lower. 
However, most of the investment and commercial banks belong to the same financial 
groups, which may explain that similarity. 
Lack of transparency was found in the minimum binding disclosure 
requirements, and also in voluntary disclosures (for example, in respect of operational 
risk, capital structure and capital adequacy). These sub-optimal levels of usefulness 
impacted negatively on the effectiveness of market discipline in several ways. 
Assuming usefulness to investors is a direct function of attaining the qualitative 
characteristics of relevance, reliability, understandability, and comparability, our 
findings for PCIs that have adopted IAS/IFRS confirm previous research.4,5,7-21  
As in other countries, transparency across companies was impaired by 
comparability difficulties. Breaches of the other three desired qualitative characteristics 
of financial statements were found too. This reduces the usefulness of risk-related 
information in decision making, because users face considerable difficulty in capturing 
the appropriate risk profile of a credit institution and in comparing that profile across 
the sector.  
The potential understandability of narratives was poor. This was compounded by 
a lack of narratives to explain numerical disclosures. The result is a potential increase in 
the probability of multiple interpretations by readers, arising from the imprecision, 
vagueness and the misleading nature of the statements made. Numerical risk disclosures 
were useful, but not fully transparent. They lacked reliability (for example, VaR 
statistics) because no stress tests or back tests were made to assure the reliability of 
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those statistics under different scenarios or because non-parametric methods of 
measurement were used. And they lacked comparability across companies too, because 
the disclosure practices differed. Further, they are likely not to be understood fully by 
users, because they are not aligned with narrative explanations. Users do not know if the 
information relates to bad news or good news, because usually, no further information is 
given. Where given, it is dispersed throughout the annual report.  
Considerable sub-optimal levels of mandatory disclosures of market risk, 
liquidity risk, and risk management objectives and policies were found among PCIs. 
Similar sub-optimal levels were found in prior research before the adoption of high 
quality standards such as IFRS 7,5,8,10,13-16 and by banks in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Credit risk disclosures presented optimal levels of mandatory compliance, similar to the 
findings of Frolov7 and KPMG.19,20 
Although we did not analyse risk disclosures after the adoption of IFRS 7, 
Bischof,17 Ernst and Young,18 KPMG,19,20 and PriceWaterhouseCoopers21confirm that 
such adoption does not guarantee transparency, or assure the effectiveness of market 
discipline. Potential reasons might be that IAS/IFRS are not aligned with the way 
financial companies manage risk, and they are not bank-oriented standards.21 IAS/IFRS 
focus only on financial risk and ignore that banks face other kinds of risks, such as 
operational risks. This mis-alignment can culminate in the dispersal of risk reporting 
practices throughout an annual report, rendering them not comparable, and lacking in 
precision.14-16,19,21  
Furthermore, the principles-based nature of IAS implies the use of professional 
judgement leading to non-comparable reporting practices. An obvious conclusion seems 
to be that institutions with risk-related disclosures should work together to require a 
consistent disclosure process. 
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Recent studies confirm that transparency flaws have been detected even after the 
adoption of IFRS 7 and Basel II, Pillar III. Consequently, the argument that “the extent 
to which accounting rules influence [accounting quality among non-finance companies] 
(...) depends on how well these rules are enforced”53 is important and valid for 
companies in the banking sector. Portuguese supervisory and regulatory entities (such 
as the Portuguese Central Bank and Portuguese Stock Exchange Committee) should 
promote enforcement mechanisms to assure compliance with minimum disclosure 
requirements. This would grant a “socially desirable” flow of information, and 
culminate in higher levels and more effective market discipline. If better risk reporting 
is mandated, this will encourage companies to implement better risk management. The 
better risk management systems are, the better risk reporting seems likely to be.54  
Our findings should be assessed with regard for several limitations. First, the 
content analysis method (used widely in reported research across many disciplines) does 
not allow readily for in-depth qualitative analysis of disclosures. Second, the potential 
for information about risk to be provided in media other than annual reports (such as 
interim reports, press-releases, web sites, analyst meetings or prospectuses) should not 
be overlooked. Third, the data analysed pre-date the operationalization of IFRS 7 and 
the Basel II Accord, in January, 2007. Future research could investigate factors likely to 
lead to better risk-related disclosures (such as visibility, ownership structure, board of 
director’s membership or other corporate governance structural features). Also, use of 
2008 annual reports would help in analysis of whether the same deficiencies persist 
after the adoption of IFRS 7 and the Basel II Accord. 
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Table 1: Minimum disclosure requirements before and after the adoption of IFRS 7  
 
Risk Categorya Before IFRS 7 adoption 
(IAS 1, IAS 30 and IAS 32) 
After IFRS 7 adoption 
(IAS 1, IFRS 7) 
Genericb - Basis of preparation of financial 
statements; 
- Specific accounting policies used 
(such as the basis of measurement). 
- Description of financial risk 
management objectives and policies. 
- Basis of preparation of financial 
statements; 
- Specific accounting policies used (such 
as the basis of measurement). 
- Description of financial risk management 
objectives and policies. 
Credit - Details of movements in any 
allowance for impairment losses and 
advances during the period; 
- Aggregate amount of impairment 
losses; 
- Maximum credit risk exposures; 
- Potential risk concentrations (e.g. by 
industry type). 
- Total credit risk exposure and quality; 
- Analysis of aged past due non-impaired 
assets; 
- Analysis of individual impaired financial 
assets; 
- Collateral held or repossessed; 
- Carrying amounts of renegotiated assets. 
Marketc - Interest risk exposure detailed by 
contractual repricing or maturity 
dates; 
- Nature and extent of off-balance sheet 
instruments exposed to interest rate 
risk; 
- Repricing gap analysis; 
- Sensitivity analysis of how risk 
exposures are managed and 
controlled. 
- Detailed information about VaR models 
(assumptions, parameters and 
limitations); 
- Sensitivity analysis for each type of 
market risk . Description of the method, 
assumptions and parameters used. 
Liquidity  - Liquidity gap analysis of assets and 
liabilities according to their maturity. 
- Maturity analysis for financial liabilities; 
- Qualitative disclosures about how 
liquidity risk is managed. 
Capital 
Structure and 
Adequacy 
 - Description of what is managed as 
capital; 
- Nature of capital requirements imposed 
externally; 
- Description of how capital requirements 
are incorporated into management of 
capital; 
- Description of how managing capital 
objectives being met. 
a Disclosures for operational risks are voluntary. IAS/IFRS only regulate financial risks. There are no specific 
disclosure requirements for operational risks. 
 b Article 66 of the Portuguese Companies Code requires companies to disclose in the management report their 
financial risk exposures and financial risk management objectives and policies. Therefore, if specific risk-related 
disclosures were found in the management report, these disclosures were considered mandatory. 
c Market risks includes interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity risk and commodities risk. 
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Table 2: Portuguese Credit Institutions in the sample 
 
Number of companies
Commercial Banks
   - Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks [MACBs] 101
   - Other Commercial 22
Investment Banks 18
Credit Financial Institutions [CFIs] 15
Financial Holding Companies 21
Other Entities 13
Total 190
The Portuguese finance sector is composed of credit institutions and financial companies.
Decree-Law 298/92 defines credit institutions as “companies whose business is to receive
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own accounts”
(Article 2). Financial companies are “companies that are not credit institutions” (Article 5). This
study deals only with risk-related reporting practices of credit institutions. 
In recognition of the different business goals of banks, we categorised them as commercial
banks and investment banks. 17 Commercial banks deal with checking, savings, and money
market accounts. They accept deposits and perform lending activities. Investment banks raise
capital, trade securities and manage corporate mergers and acquisitions. Commercial banks were 
divided into Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks [MACBs] , and Other banks . Only MACBs
have adopted the PAPBS in their individual accounts according to Notice 1/2005 of the
Portuguese Central Bank. All the other companies have adopted adjusted IAS/IFRS rules.
Credit Financial Institutions are regulated by Decree-Law 186/2002 and are very similar to
banks. They focus on lending activities, but cannot receive deposits from the public. 
Financial holding companies are financial companies registered by the Portuguese Central
Bank. They hold and control equity shares of PCIs included in the sample. Notice 1/2005 of the
Portuguese Central Bank also applies to financial holding companies whose subsidiaries are
credit or investment companies. To be considered a financial holding company their subsidiaries
should represent at least 50% of consolidated assets. However, the Portuguese Central Bank can
propose other criteria. 
Other entities deal with leasing, factoring, and mutual guarantee activities; investment
companies; and credit-purchase financing companies not classified as banks or credit financial
institutions.  
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Table 3: Portuguese Credit Institutions with narrative disclosures about risk-related 
information in risk management sections 
MACBs
Other 
Commercial Investment CFIs
Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Key 0 23 17 27 5 8
Generic 0 73 83 67 43 38
Risks 0 82 78 67 38 38
Other 0 27 17 0 5 0
Credit risk 0 91 89 73 19 23
Market risk 0 82 78 27 24 0
Liquidity risk 0 82 67 33 19 8
Operational risk 0 50 44 47 10 15
Credit risk 0 73 78 67 14 38
Market risk 0 68 83 20 14 15
Liquidity risk 1 59 67 27 10 15
Operational risk 0 27 44 33 10 15
Management report 0 64 44 27 33 23
Notes specific 0 91 100 80 52 54
Risk management sections
Risks identified
Definitions
Risk management policies followed
Overall control structure
Banks
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Table 4: Portuguese Credit Institutions with credit risk disclosures in annual reports 
 
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Size of credit risk exposure 99 100 100 100 29 100
Narrative explanations of numerical disclosures 1 59 56 80 0 46
Size of past due and impaired assets 100 100 100 100 33 92
Narrative explanations of numerical disclosures 0 27 22 33 0 31
Size of collateral (other enhancements held) 98 41 39 27 5 8
Credit risk quality
Discussion of credit risk indicators 60 82 28 53 29 8
Summary of internal rating systems 2 73 39 67 19 8
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Size of credit risk exposure
By industry sector (maturing and past due assets) 0 27 17 7 0 8
By maturing assets
Prior year groups (up to 1 year) 0 5 0 0 0 15
Prior year groups (up to 2 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 3 years) 0 0 6 7 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 5 years) 1 9 22 33 0 15
Prior year groups, with qualitative groups 97 41 22 20 0 46
No prior year groups (up to 5 years) 0 9 0 7 0 0
No prior year groups, with qualitative groups 0 14 17 0 0 0
Aged past due assets (time bands)
Prior year groups, only 11 32 33 27 0 8
Prior year groups (up to 1 year) 0 9 6 0 0 15
Prior year groups (up to 3 years) 0 36 22 20 0 8
Prior year groups (up to 4 years) 3 0 0 7 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 5 years) 0 5 11 13 0 8
Panel B: Comparability problems in credit risk reporting practices 
Banks
Panel A: Frequent credit risk reporting pratices
Banks
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Table 5: Portuguese Credit Institutions with market risk disclosures in annual reports 
 
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Market risk exposure
Foreign exchange risk exposure 0 41 72 0 5 15
Interest rate risk exposure 1 77 83 47 24 31
Measured by maturity dates/repricing gap 0 50 56 13 5 31
Presentation of a repricing gap table 0 36 33 13 0 23
Value-at Risk monetary results 0 32 33 0 5 0
Sensitivity analysis monetary results 0 27 6 7 0 0
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Maturity/repricing time bands
Prior year figures, only 0 0 0 13 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 2 years) 0 0 6 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 3 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 5 17 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 7 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 20 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 18 6 0 0 23
No prior year figures (up to 15 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Value-at-Risk assumptions
The use of Value-at-Risk 0 45 72 0 10 0
Methodology used - riskmetrics 0 9 17 0 0 0
Methodology used - historical simulation 0 18 28 0 10 0
Methodology used - montecarlo simulation 0 9 6 0 0 0
Confidence level/Holding period 0 0 0 0 0 0
99% / 1 day 0 9 6 0 5 0
99% / 10 days 0 32 17 0 5 0
99% / 22 days 0 0 6 0 0 0
99% / 90 days 0 0 6 0 0 0
99% / 2 weeks 0 9 6 0 0 0
95% / … 0 5 0 0 0 0
The use of stress tests 0 32 33 0 5 0
The use of backtests 0 27 44 0 10 0
Sensitivity analysis assumptions
The use of sensitivity analysis 0 45 50 7 19 0
Periodicity of analysis - monthly 0 9 11 0 0 0
Periodicity of analysis - quaterly 0 5 0 0 0 0
Period of impact (12 months, only) 0 5 17 7 0 0
Basis point value used - 100 bvp 0 9 22 0 0 0
Basis point value used - 200 bvp 0 23 0 7 5 0
Panel A: Frequent market risk reporting practices
Banks
Panel B: Comparability problems in market risk reporting practices
Banks
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Table 6: Portuguese Credit Institutions with liquidity risk disclosures in annual reports 
   
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Liquidity gap analysis table 0 55 67 47 10 31
Discussion of values 0 9 0 0 0 0
Other isolated maturity groups 99 32 6 27 0 15
0 0 6 0 0 0
Clear discussion of funding policies 0 32 11 7 5 0
MACBs
Other 
Commercial Investment CFIs
Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Liquidity gap analysis table
Maturity concept clearly stated 99 41 61 40 5 15
Maturity time bands
Prior year figures (up to 1 year) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 14 6 20 5 8
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 1 2 3 4 5
Prior year figures (up to 10 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
No prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Other isolated maturity time bands
Prior year figures (up to 1 year) 0 9 0 7 0 8
Prior year figures (up to 3 years) 0 0 6 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 23 17 0 0 8
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 18 17 13 5 15
No prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 14 11 0 0 0
Banks
Panel A: Frequent liquidity risk reporting practices
Panel B: Comparability problems in liquidity risk reporting practices
Clear alignement between liquidity gap and 
funding policies
Banks
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Table 7: Portuguese Credit Institutions with operational risk disclosures in annual 
reports 
 
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Operational risk exposure 0 5 0 0 0 0
Clear statement of adaptation to Basel II
Adaptation of information systems 3 41 28 20 19 8
Adaptation completed 0 5 0 0 0 0
Banks
Frequent operational risk reporting practices
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Table 8: Portuguese Credit Institutions with capital structure and adequacy disclosures 
in annual reports 
 
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Capital structure
Accounting structure 100 100 100 100 100 100
Amount of Tier 1 2 14 0 0 0 0
Amount of Tier 2 5 27 0 7 10 0
Amount of Tier 3 0 0 0 0 5 0
Total elegible capital value 48 41 6 13 10 0
Discussion about its composition 6 23 0 7 10 0
Capital adequacy
Discussion of capital adequacy approach 0 5 6 0 0 0
Capital requirements for credit risk 0 9 6 0 0 0
Capital requirements for market risk 0 5 0 0 0 0
Capital requirements for operational risk 0 5 0 0 0 0
Total capital ratio 63 77 67 33 43 8
Tier 1 ratio 11 41 28 7 29 0
Tier 2 ratio 0 9 0 0 0 0
Total capital ratio according to Basel II 0 9 6 0 5 0
MACBs Other 
Commercial
Investment CFIs Financial 
Holdings
Other 
Entities
% % % % % %
Capital adequacy approaches to be adopted
Credit risk
Standard approach (SA) 1 23 11 0 10 8
Internal ratings based approach (IRB) 0 27 17 20 10 0
Market risk
Standard approach 1 0 6 0 0 8
Internal models approach 0 14 0 13 0 0
Operational risk
Basic indicator approach (BIA) 1 14 6 0 0 0
Standard approach (SA) 0 23 6 0 0 8
Advanced measurement approach (AMA) 0 18 6 13 10 0
Panel A: Capital struture and adequacy reporting practices
Panel B: Adoption of capital adequacy approches proposed by Basel II requirements
Banks
Banks
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Appendix A: Definitions of risk-related categories 
General information: disclosures of risk definitions, risk management policies followed 
and the existence of a comprehensive risk report. 
Credit risk: the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms. 
Market risk: the risk of losses in on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet positions 
arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are: the 
risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book; 
foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. 
Liquidity risk: the risk that the firm will not be able to efficiently meet both expected 
and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without affecting 
either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm. 
Operational risk: the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events. 
Capital structure and adequacy: a key principle in bank supervision used as a measure 
of banks’ financial strength and stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
